Leopold Mozart, the Rationalist? Humanism and Good Taste in Eighteenth-Century Musical Thought by Walker, Katherine H
Yale Journal of Music & Religion
Volume 3 | Number 2 Article 4
2017
Leopold Mozart, the Rationalist? Humanism and
Good Taste in Eighteenth-Century Musical
Thought
Katherine H. Walker
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Follow this and additional works at: http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yjmr
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Yale Journal of Music & Religion by an authorized editor of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more
information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walker, Katherine H. (2017) "Leopold Mozart, the Rationalist? Humanism and Good Taste in Eighteenth-Century Musical Thought,"
Yale Journal of Music & Religion: Vol. 3: No. 2, Article 4.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17132/2377-231X.1084
Yale Journal of Music & Religion Vol. 3, No. 2 (2017) 64 
Leopold Mozart the 
Rationalist? 





Twenty years after Dale Van Kley’s The 
Religious Origins of the French Revolution, which 
situated Catholic theology, in general, and 
Jansenist-related controversies, in specific, at 
the heart of French Revolutionary politics, it is 
now commonplace to acknowledge the re-
ligious underpinnings of eighteenth-century 
cultural, political, philosophical, and social life 
in Europe.1 To paraphrase Jonathon Sheehan, 
one of the earliest and most probing examiners 
of this historiography, eighteenth-century 
studies have now richly embraced religion.2  
 This is not to say that the traditional 
narrative, which identified the Enlightenment 
as the “cradle of the secular world,” was 
entirely unfounded. The antireligious posture 
of the Philosophes, among the most vocal and 
																																																								
1 Dale Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French 
Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560–1791 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). 
2 Jonathan Sheehan, ‘‘Enlightenment, Religion, and 
the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay,’’ 
American Historical Review 108 (2003): 1061–80. See also 
Simon Grote, “Review-Essay: Religion and Enlighten-
ment,” Journal of the History of Ideas 75/1 (January 2014): 
137–60; Ritchie Robertson, ‘‘Religion and Enlighten-
ment: A Review Essay,’’ German History 25 (2007): 422–
31; Jeremy Gregory, ‘‘Introduction: Transforming ‘the 
Age of Reason’ into ‘an Age of Faiths’: Or, Putting 
Religions and Beliefs (Back) into the Eighteenth 
Century,’’ Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 32 (2009): 
287–305; Charly Coleman, ‘‘Resacralizing the World: 
The Fate of Secularization in Enlightenment His-
toriography,’’ Journal of Modern History 82 (2010): 368–
95; Ulrich Lehner, The Catholic Enlightenment: The For-
gotten History of a Global Movement (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
prolific voices of the pre-Kantian rationalistic 
Enlightenment, provides undeniable evidence 
of secularization. Nonetheless, as recent his-
toriographies have shown, the assumption that 
the Philosophes’ writings reflect the broader 
intellectual climate of the Enlightenment is 
simply not supported by evidence.3 Notwith-
standing the tenor of those writings, the 
Enlightenment was, it turns out, deeply and 
broadly informed by religion.  
 The religious turn in eighteenth-century 
studies has created opportunities to revisit and 
refine some of our most entrenched narratives 
about this period in history. Prominent re-
visionist histories incorporate religion and 
anticlericalism, tradition and progress, reason 
and faith into what are now richer and more 
complex tapestries of the Enlightenment.  
 One acknowledged point of intersection 
among these seemingly tendentious ideologies 
in the age of Enlightenment is the Jesuit 
education system. Although The Society of 
Jesus was widely propagandized in the eigh-
teenth century as obstructive to reason and 
progress, current scholarship is increasingly 
attuned to the ways in which the Jesuit 
education system nourished the progressive 
tendencies of the Enlightenment. 4  This sys-
																																																								
3 Sheehan discusses the recent scholarly effort to 
de-center the philosophically oriented French En-
lightenment, in “Enlightenment, Religion,” 1070. See 
also Derek Beales, “Christians and Philosophes: The 
Case of the Austrian Enlightenment,” in Enlightenment 
and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe (New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 2005), 60–89. 
4  Marc Fumaroli, “The Fertility and the Short-
comings of Renaissance Rhetoric: The Jesuit Case,” in 
The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773, ed. 
John W. O’Malley, Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven T. 
Harris, and Frank Kennedy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999), 100; Marcus Hellyer, “Jesuit 
Physics in Eighteenth-Century Germany: Some Im-
portant Continuities,” in ibid., 538–54; Steven Harris, 
“Boscovich, the ‘Boscovich Circle,’ and the Revival of 
a Jesuit Science,” in R. J. Boscovich: Vita e attività 
scientifica: His Life and Scientific Work, ed. Piers Bursill-
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tem, which was founded on the humanist 
neoclassicism that proliferated in the Renais-
sance, was philosophically sophisticated, intel-
lectually rigorous, and theologically uncom-
promising. 
 Using Leopold Mozart, father to Wolf-
gang Amadeus Mozart, as a case study, my 
purpose in what follows is to show, in the 
domain of music, how the Christian faith 
could accommodate and even encourage 
enlightened values. Leopold’s philosophy of 
art and worldview, as exhibited throughout 
his Versuch einer gründlichen Violinschule (A 
Treatise on the Fundamental Principles of 
Violin Playing) and correspondence, reflect 
the influence of classical authors whom he 
would have studied in the course of his 
religious education. Far from manifesting ten-
sion, Leopold’s religious education provided 
the very pathways to his enlightened 
philosophy.  
 To be clear, I do not argue here that 
Leopold’s philosophy of art is inherently 
religious; to do so would require a separate 
study. I make the more modest claim that 
Leopold would not have perceived a tension 
between that enlightened philosophy and his 
Christian faith, and thus neither should we. 
 Despite many discussions in the literature 
of Leopold Mozart’s enlightened philosophy of 
																																																																																			
Hall (Rome: Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1993), 
527–48; Maurice Whitehead, “‘Superior to the Rudest 
Shocks of Adversity’: English Jesuit Education and 
Culture in the Long Eighteenth Century, 1688–1832,” 
in Educating the Child in Enlightenment Britain: Beliefs, 
Cultures, Practices, ed. Jill Shefrin and Mary Hilton 
(Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009), 131–46; James M. 
Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to 
Kant (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 
1996), 43; Jeffrey Burson, The Rise and Fall of the 
Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and the 
Ideological Polarization of Eighteenth-Century France (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). 
art,5 there has yet been no effort to situate that 
philosophy within the boundaries of his 
Catholic faith. By reading Leopold’s personal 
and professional writings intertextually, through 
classical authors that formed the basis of his 
Jesuit education, this study refines his traditional 
characterization as a rationalist, while offering 
new insights into his aesthetics and worldview. 
In doing so, it not only contributes to the 
growing consensus that the turn toward 
enlightened rationalism was not always a turn 
away from Christian faith; it further advances 
our understanding of Leopold’s aesthetics in 
specific and enlightened rationalism in general. 
Thus begins a story of Leopold Mozart, 




5 On Leopold and the Enlightenment, see Rainer 
Buland, “Leopold Mozart: Prototyp des aufgeklärten 
Bürgers,” Acta mozartiana 58/2 (December 2011): 99–
118; Hans Valentin, “‘Was die Bücher anlanget’ . . . 
Leopold Mozarts literarische Interessen,” in Leopold 
Mozart. 1719–1787. Bild einer Persönlichkeit, ed. Ludwig 
Wegele (Augsburg: Verlag Die Brigg, 1969), 102–10; 
Josef Mancal, “Neues über Leopold Mozart: Gedanken 
zum 200. Todestag,” Österreichische Musikzeitschrift 42/6 
(June 1987): 282–91.  
On Leopold and rationalism, see Piero Melograni, 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart: A Biography, trans. Lydia G. 
Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 
6; David Schroeder, Mozart in Revolt: Strategies of 
Resistance, Mischief, and Deception (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1999), 51; Erich Broy, “Die ‘gewisse 
gute Art’ zu spielen: Überlegungen zu Ästhetik und 
Methodik in Leopold Mozarts Violinschule,” Neues 
musikwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch 14 (2006): 17–62.  
On Leopold and humanism, see Walter Kurt 
Kreyszig, “‘Leopold Mozart . . . a man of much . . . 
sagacity’: The Revival of Humanist Scholarship in His 
Gründliche Violinschule (Augsburg, 1756),” in Music’s 
Intellectual History, ed. Zdravko Blažeković and Barbara 
Dobbs Mackenzie (New York: RILM, 2009), 43–156; 
Eleonora Beck, “A New Reading of the Mozart Family 
Portrait,” Imago musicae: International Yearbook of Musical 
Iconography (2017): 29.  
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Leopold the Rationalist? 
Rationalism is the key word in writings on 
Leopold Mozart, and it is set in frequent 
counterpoint to Wolfgang’s perceived genius. 
Hermann Abert, for example, concludes that 
“as a rationalist at heart, [Leopold] utterly 
failed to appreciate the true nature of genius, 
whose workings are influenced by no external 
aims.” 6  In Alfred Einstein’s similar view, 
Leopold “is half rationalist, half ‘popular,’ 
while Wolfgang is never rationalistic and 
never popular, but godlike, regal, and 
aristocratic.” 7  More recently, Maynard Solo-
mon reads the “patchwork absurdities . . . 
plundered from myth” in Die Zauberflöte as 
ultimately giving way to “the service of 
patriarchal imperatives that would have been 
very much to the liking of such rationalists as 
Don Alfonso, Sarastro, and Leopold Mo-
zart.” 8  For David Schroeder (in a conside-
ration of an Italian translation of Leopold’s 
Versuch), the text “expressed his own Gott-
schedian view about what the nature of the 
language of a manual of instruction should 
be,” a view that comes “very near to 
Gottsched’s ideals of ‘Natur and Vernunft’ 
(nature and reason).”9 For these scholars, in 
the words of Piero Melograni, Leopold was 
“an Enlightenment man, rational and con-
crete.”10 
 In his own day, too, Leopold’s profes-
sional outlook and activities were associated 
with reason and learning. F. W. Marpurg, for 
																																																								
6  Hermann Abert, W. A. Mozart (Breitkopf & 
Härtel, 1923–24); ed. Cliff Eisen and trans. Stewart 
Spencer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 
343; see also pp. 8, 344, and 528. 
7 Alfred Einstein, Mozart: His Character, His Work 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 111. 
8 Maynard Solomon, Mozart: A Life (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1995), lxxviii. 
9 Schroeder, Mozart in Revolt, 51.  
10 Melograni, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart: A Biography, 
6. 
instance, recommended Leopold’s Versuch to 
the “sound and skilled virtuoso, the rational 
and methodical teacher, the learned musician; 
[for] all of those qualities that make a man of 
worth are developed together here.” 11  And 
Dominikus Hagenauer’s sober praise upon 
Leopold’s death emphasized his “wit” and 
“wisdom,”12 traits associated with the exem-
plary Enlightenment man. 13  This characteri-
																																																								
11 “Der gründliche und geschickte Virtuose, der 
vernünftige und methodische Lehrmeister, der gelehrte 
Musikus, diese Eigenschaften, deren jede einzeln einen 
verdienten Mann macht, entwickeln sich allhier zu-
sammen.” F. W. Marpurg, Historische-kritische Beiträge zur 
Tonkunst, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1757), 160; trans. Alfred 
Einstein in the Preface to A Treatise on the Fundamental 
Principles of Violin Playing by Leopold Mozart, trans. Edith 
Knocker, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1951), xxiv. 
12 “Witz” and “Klugheit,” from Dominikus Ha-
genauer’s diary, May 28, 1787, in Otto Erich Deutsch, 
Mozart: Die Dokumente seines Lebens (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 
1961), 293; Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Neue Ausgabe 
sämtlicher Werke, Serie X: Supplement, 258. The English 
edition of Deutsch’s work translates the passage as “wit 
and sagacity”; Mozart: A Documentary Biography, ed. Otto 
Erich Deutsch, trans. Peter Branscombe, Eric Blom, 
and Jeremy Noble (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1965), 293. 
13 The ability to both “edify and entertain” was 
granted the highest status in this period. Alexander 
Pope’s poetry, for example, was lauded by a 
contemporary reviewer for its interplay among “beauty, 
wit, and wisdom”: “The distinguishing perfections of 
his poetry are beauty, wit, and wisdom. If we are not 
elevated, we are charmed; if we are not transported, we 
are diverted and instructed.” “Memoirs of Alexander 
Pope,” Literary and Biographical Magazine, and British 
Review 2 (London: J. Parsons, July 1793): 327.  
A dedicatory poem to “immortal” John Gay 
similarly emphasizes his work’s rare combination of wit 
and wisdom: “I perceive, you want to look, / at leisure 
hours upon a book; / And such an one wou’d gladly 
choose, / As may both profit, and amuse. / . . . / 
Immortal Gay, sure, all must prize, / who merry makes 
us, and yet wise. / . . . / Good poets are so wondrous 
scant, / we seldom meet with what we want. / Few 
rhyming authors (to be plain) / both edify and 
entertain. / But here, both wit and wisdom mix; / 
Here, sir, with lucky hand, you fix, / on one, a most by 
all confess’d / to be a most the very best.” Anon., “I 
perceive you want to look. . . . ,” London Magazine and 
Monthly Chronologer 6 (London: C. Ackers, 1737): 98. 
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zation reflects Leopold’s correspondence with 
the elder Hagenauer, in which both wit and 
wisdom were on display. In a 1768 letter to 
Lorenz Hagenauer, Leopold famously con-
demned the Viennese public, who “are not 
curious to see serious and rational [vernünftige] 
things, of which they have little or no 
concept. They like nothing but foolish tricks, 
dancing, devils, spirits, magical spells, Hans-
wurst, Lipperl, Bernardon, witches, and ap-
paritions—this is well known and their theater 
shows it every day.” 14  This and Leopold’s 
numerous other allusions to Vernunft cor-
roborate accounts from his own time to the 
present day: reason and learning were core 
elements of his worldview.  
 His enthusiasm for Gottsched, Gellert, 
Fux, Mattheson, Scheibe, and Marpurg (all 
prominent exponents of the early German 
Enlightenment),15 as well as his documented 
																																																								
14  “nicht begierig sind ernsthafte und Vernünftige 
sachen zu sehen, auch wenig oder gar keinen Begriff 
davon haben, und nichts als närrisches Zeug, tanzen, 
teufel, gespenster, Zaubereyen, Hanswurst, Lipperl, 
Bernardon, Hexen, und Erscheinungen sehen wollen, 
ist eine bekannte Sache und ihre theater beweisen es 
täglich.” Wilhelm A. Bauer, Otto Friedrich Deutsch, 
Joseph Heinz Eibl and Ulrich Konrad, eds., Mozart. 
Briefe und Aufzeichnungen. Gesamtausgabe, 8 vol. (Kassel: 
Ba ̈renreiter, 2005), 1: 254; cited and trans. in Daniel 
Heartz, Haydn, Mozart, and the Viennese School, 1740–
1780 (New York: Norton, 1995), 20. The Anderson 
edition translates “ernsthafte und Vernünftige” as 
“serious and sensible.” See Emily Anderson, The Letters 
of Mozart and His Family (1966); cited from the 3rd ed. 
(New York: Norton, 1989), 80. Hanswurst, Lipperl, 
and Bernardon were three comedic stock characters in 
the eighteenth-century German theater, whom Leopold 
among others found to be in poor taste. See Heartz, 
Haydn, Mozart, and the Viennese School, 18–22. 
15 On Leopold’s views regarding Gottsched, see 
Schroeder, Mozart in Revolt, 51; on Gellert, see ibid., 53–
54, and specifically Schroeder’s discussion of Gellert’s 
response to Leopold’s (presumably) admiring lost letter 
of April 1, 1754, ibid., 54; on Fux, Mattheson, Scheibe, 
and Marpurg, see the introductory section of Leopold’s 
Versuch, entitled “A Short History of Music,” where he 
refers to these and other authors as “men who by their 
writings on music have earned great credit in the 
interest in experimental physics, astonomy, 
and meteorology,16 further identify him with 
enlightenment and reason. As Volkmar 
Braunbehrens concludes, “Leopold Mozart is 
a characteristic exponent of the rationalistic 
Enlightenment: broadly educated, virtually 
universal in his interests, imbued with the idea 
that everything can be grasped and under-
stood through proper application of the 
rational intellect, and possessed of an ability 
to convey his knowledge to others.”17  
 In fact, Leopold was not imbued with the 
idea that everything can be grasped purely 
intellectually. As a devout Catholic, Leopold 
would have conceded that some truths are 
available only through divine revelation and 
are thus, in the words of Leibniz, “the proper 
matter of faith.”18 To be sure, for Leibniz, as 
for Locke before him, reason and faith are 
complementary, as they both access and 
																																																																																			
scientific world” (die sich durch ihre Schriften um die 
Musik bey der gelehrten Welt ungemein verdient 
gemacht haben). Leopold Mozart, Versuch einer 
gründlichen Violinschule (Augsburg: Johann Jacob Lotter, 
1756), 17; for English translation, see A Treatise on the 
Fundamental Principles of Violin Playing by Leopold Mozart, 
2nd ed., trans. Edith Knocker (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1951), 22. (My translations here and 
throughout the article sometimes depart from the 
Knocker edition.) 
16 Genevieve Geffray, “‘Die Narren sind halt aller 
Orten nicht gescheid’: Leopold Mozart und die 
Sonnenfinsternis in Paris, anno 1764,” Mitteilungen der 
Internationalen Stiftung Mozarteum 47/3–4 (November 
1999): 19–23. 
17  Volkmar Braunbehrens, “‘Väterlicher Freund, 
gehorsamster Sohn.’ Leopold und Wolfgang A. 
Mozart,” in Väter und Söhne: zwölf biographische Porträts 
(Berlin: Rowohlt, 1996), 17.  
18  “die eigentlichen Gegenstände des Glaubens 
sind.” Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz, Neue 
Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand (1704), IV, 
§7; trans. as Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding, 
ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 497. 
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conform to truth.19 Nevertheless, even in the 
age of reason, some truths can be accessed 
through faith alone.  
 Leopold’s lifelong observance of Catholi-
cism reflects his acknowledgment of faith, 
“above reason,” as a source of truth.20 Indeed, 
his childhood family was active in the 
congregation of the Assumption of the Holy 
Virgin (associated with the Marian Brother-
hood in Augsburg); beginning in 1722, they 
lived in a house owned by the Jesuit Order (in 
the Jesuitengasse). 21  His formal education, 
first at the Jesuit St. Salvator Gymnasium and 
then—though he withdrew after one year—at 
the corresponding lyceum, emphasized 
theology, science, and rhetoric in preparation 
for his would-be entrance into the 
priesthood.22 His godfather was a canon at St. 
Peter’s and a prominent churchman in the 
community.23 Following two failed academic 
terms, Leopold settled permanently in the pre-
dominately Catholic city of Salzburg, where 
he undertook his first professional position as 
chamberlain and musician to the Salzburg 
canon Count Johann Baptist Thurn-Valassina 
and Taxis. Leopold’s daily devotional prac-
tices and strict observation of Catholic rites—
as attested by his correspondence—identify 
him as a devout Catholic.24 
 The contrast (and conflict) in this regard 
between father and son is particularly pro-
																																																								
19 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing (1639), Bk. 4, §23; cited in 4th ed. (London: 
Awnsham and Churchil, 1700), 416. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Solomon, Mozart, 22. 
22 Ibid.; see also Robert W. Gutman, Mozart: A 
Cultural Biography (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 
13–14. 
23 Solomon, Mozart, 22; Abert, W. A. Mozart, 2. 
24 For a summary of Leopold’s religous beliefs and 
devotional activities, as exhibited in his corres-
pondence, see Cliff Eisen and Simon P. Keefe, eds., 
The Cambridge Mozart Encyclopedia (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006), 324–25. 
nounced in a series of letters spanning the 
years 1777–79, the period during which 
Wolfgang undertook a professional tour, in his 
mother’s company, through Munich, Augs-
burg, Mannheim, and Paris. On Wolfgang’s 
approaching name-day, for example, Leopold 
urged his son to protect his soul and honor his 
duties as a “true Catholic Christian.”25 Though 
Leopold elsewhere claimed to sympathize with 
Wolfgang’s youthful disinclination to focus on 
his soul,26 he nevertheless admonished him to 
put God first: “From his hands we receive our 
temporal happiness; and at the same time we 
must think of our eternal salvation.”27 He thus 
implored his son to avoid all “dangers to [the] 
soul”;28 to keep God and honor in his con-
sciousness; and to prevent the irrevocable— 
indeed, eternal—consequences of foolishness.29  
 When Wolfgang’s tour led him to the 
Protestant city of Weilburg, Leopold urged his 
son not to linger there, for he would find no 
Catholic churches in which to attend Mass.30 
“Hold fast to God,” Leopold repeatedly urged 
																																																								
25  “eines wahren Catholischen Christen.” Bauer 
and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2: 79. 
26  “junge Leute hörn dergleichen Sachen nicht 
gerne, ich weis es, ich war auch jung; allein gott sey 
Danck gesagt, ich kam doch bey allen meinen 
jugendlichen Narrenspossen immer wieder zu mir 
selbst, flohe alle Gefahren meiner Seele und hatte 
immer gott und meine Ehre, und die Folgen, die 
gefährlichen folgen vor Augen” (Young people do not 
like to hear about these things, I know, for I was once 
young myself. But, thank God, in spite of all my 
youthful foolish pranks, I always pulled myself 
together. I avoided all dangers to my soul and ever kept 
God and my honour and the consequences, the very 
dangerous consequences of foolishness, before my 
eyes). Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 
2: 188; trans. Anderson, Letters, 422. 
27 “gott geht vor allem! von dem müssen wir unser 
zeitliches glück erwarten, und für das ewige immer 
Sorge tragen.” Ibid. 
28 “Gefahren meiner Seele.” Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30  Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeich-
nungen, 2: 166–67; trans. Anderson, Letters, 407. 
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his son, “who will see to everything.”31 If in 
his constant pleas and reminders Leopold was 
sometimes overbearing, he was at least not 
hypocritical. As his correspondence in this 
period testifies, Leopold attended numerous 
daily church services, prayed morning and 
night, and continued to devote himself to 
what he regarded as his primary Christian 
duty: that is, to see to the full development of 
his son’s God-granted gifts.  
 Leopold’s investment in accommodating 
faith into his rationalist aesthetic and 
pedagogical framework comes to light in the 
introduction to his Versuch. He begins the 
brief section entitled “A Short History of 
Music” with an unselfconscious appeal to 
mystical aspects of Christianity, including the 
Creation, Adam, the Flood, and Noah’s ark.32 
 When, however, his history extends 
beyond the scope of scripture, reasoned skep-
ticism takes hold. In a footnote accompanying 
his reference to Orpheus and “the testimonies 
of the ancients” that this “wise and learned 
man” lived,33 Leopold assures the reader that 
this ancient character, though elevated to 
mythic caricature, was as mortal as any other 
man:  
At the time these men lived, learned people 
were idolized. And this is the very reason why 
everything seems so fabulous. Who knows? 
Perchance the poets of future centuries may 
have cause enough to celebrate as gods our 
present-day virtuosi of song, for it really 
seems as if old times might return.34  
																																																								
31 “Ich bitte Dich, halte Dich an gott, der muß es 
thun.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Auf-
zeichnungen, 2: 75; trans. Anderson, Letters, 334 (dated 
October 20, 1777). 
32 Mozart, Versuch, 13–14. 
33 “die allermeisten Zegnisse der Alten” and 
“weiser und gelehrter.” Mozart, Versuch, 15. 
34 “Zu jener Zeit als diese Männer lebeten, wurden 
die gelehrten Leute vergöttert. Und eben dieses ist die 
Ursache, warum alles so fabelhaft läßt. Wer weis es? 
This testimony could have come from the 
arch-rationalist Voltaire, who himself ad-
monished the writer and statesman Sir 
William Temple for his naive and super-
stitious belief in the myth of Orpheus:  
This enemy to his own times believed 
implicitly in the fable of Orpheus, and, it 
should seem, had never heard of the fine 
music of Italy, nor even of that of France, 
which do not charm serpents, it is true, but 
which do charm the ears of the connoisseur.35  
 In this sense, at least, Leopold was a man 
of his times, a rationalist dispeller of myths, 
who nevertheless observed the most orthodox 
rites and “superstitious” beliefs of his Catholic 
faith. 
 Some scholars view Leopold’s dual em-
phasis on reason and faith as paradoxical.36 
Erich Valentin situates his rationalism in 
contrast and contradiction to his faith,37 and 
David Schroeder similarly paints a picture of 
“a renegade Catholic” whose “sense of 
tolerance far outstripped the religion to which 
he remained loyal.” 38  For Schroeder in 
																																																																																			
Vielleicht haben die Poeten der künstigen Jahrhunderte 
Stoff genug unsere heutigen Virtuosen als Götter zu 
besingen? Denn es scheint wirklich als wenn die alten 
Zeiten wieder kommen mochten.” Mozart, Versuch, 15 
(note gg). Though on a finer point Leopold and Voltaire 
may be seen to disagree—the former denying the 
supernatural elements of the Orpheus myth, and the 
latter denying the myth altogether—both focus their 
skepticism on the irrational and supernatural elements 
of the history. 
 35 “Cet ennemi de son siècle croit bonnement à la 
fable d’Orphée, et n’avait apparemment entendu ni la 
belle musique d’Italie, ni même celle de France, qui à la 
vérité ne charment pas les serpents, mais qui charment 
les oreilles des connaisseurs.” Voltaire, Oeuvres complètes: 
Dictionnaire philosophique, 33: 355; trans. anon., A 
Philosophical Dictionary, from the French of M. de Voltaire 
(London: W. Dugdale, 1843), 1: 58. 
36 Gutman, Mozart: A Cultural Biography, 24–29 and 
33; Erich Valentin, “Der gelehrte Vater des genialen 
Sohnes,” in Wegele, ed., Leopold Mozart, 78–101; 
Schroeder, Mozart in Revolt, 46. 
37 Valentin, “Der gelehrte Vater,” 78–101. 
38 Schroeder, Mozart in Revolt, 46. 
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particular, Leopold sought out literary men-
tors who provided “the missing link from his 
own Catholic education”; in Gottsched in 
particular Leopold is seen to have found an 
“approach to enlightened morality” that tran-
scended “Catholic isolationism or doctrine.”39 
There is good evidence that Gottsched in-
spired Leopold, who was something of an 
intellectual omnivore. However, in order to 
understand how Leopold reconciled his 
philosophy with his faith, one is better served 
by looking beyond Gottsched, for whom, in 
the words of Detlef Döring, religion was 
“reduced to a mere cultural phenomenon.”40 
Leopold’s aesthetic also, indeed prominently, 
reflects the influence of authors who were 
endorsed by his religious institutions. 
 A clue to these alternative influences is 
provided by Walter Kurt Kreyszig, who 
corrects what he sees as a crucial oversight in 
the literature on Leopold Mozart and his 
Versuch: namely, the failure to “comment on 
the . . . solid anchoring [of] the work in the 
venerable tradition of musical humanism.”41 
Thus unfolds a meticulous survey of the his-
torical and historiographical aspects of the 
Versuch’s preface, which, for him, articulates a 
humanist concern for history and—in his 
ensuing discussion of the violin—progress.42 
Kreyszig’s argument is persuasive; in fact, he 
might have gone further in arguing for 
Leopold’s investment in musical humanism. 
																																																								
39 Ibid., 49. Erich Broy also associates Leopold 
Mozart’s aesthetic philosophy narrowly with Gott-
sched; see “Die ‘gewisse gute Art’ zu spielen.” 
40 Detlef Döring, “Leibniz’s Critique of Pufendorf: 
A Dispute in the Eve of the Enlightenment,” in The 
Practice of Reason: Leibniz and his Controversies, ed. Marcelo 
Dascal (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2010), 254. 
41 Walter Kurt Kreyszig, “‘Leopold Mozart . . . a 
man of much . . . sagacity’,” 58. 
42  On the neoclassical orientation of Leopold 
Mozart’s Versuch, see also Pierluigi Petrobelli, “La 
cultura di Leopold Mozart e la sua Violinschule,” 
Mozart-Jahrbuch (1989): 9–16. 
 Though his study is limited to key markers 
of humanist scholarship in the preface—
namely, in the listing of important theorists, 
the mentioning of prominent humanist scho-
lars (such as Gaffurio), and the emphasis on 
the roles of Greek and Roman antiquity in his 
historical account—the rhetoric and ideology 
of humanism undergird the whole of 
Leopold’s Versuch and his other writings, 
providing insight into his aesthetic, moral, 
cultural, and even political values. 
 Humanism is strongly oriented toward the 
classical humanities. This is not to say that all 
neoclassicism is humanist, for classical refer-
ences are among the most ubiquitous and 
generic style markers of the Enlightenment. 
Latin phrase books provided eighteenth-
century authors with the veneer of erudition, 
although the depth of engagement often end-
ed there. Even among the more probing 
engagements of the Philosophes, classical ref-
erences were selective (and sometimes dis-
torted). This is because the Philosophes, on 
the whole, narrowly equated classicism with 
paganism; above all, references to antiquity 
justified those Philosophes’ distanced relation-
ship to Christianity. Diderot, who was 
convinced of Cicero’s atheism despite all 
evidence to the contrary, dismissed his sacred 
references as political jargon, 43  and Hume 
went so far as to cast doubt on Cicero’s 
religious musings to his wife (emphasizing his 
willingness to appear devout):  
If there ever was a nation or a time in which 
the public religion lost all authority over 
mankind, we might expect, that infidelity in 
Rome, during the Ciceronian age, would 
																																																								
43 See Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond 
D’Alembert, “Aius-Locutius,” Encyclopédie, ou Diction-
naire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (Paris, 1751–
72), in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, ed. Jules Assézat and 
Maurice Tourneaux, vol. 13 (Paris: Garnier Frères, 
1875–77), 268.  
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openly have erected its throne, and that 
Cicero himself, in every speech and action, 
would have been its most declared abettor. 
But it appears, that, whatever skeptical 
liberties that great man might take, in his 
writings or in the philosophical conversation, 
he yet avoided, in the common conduct of 
life, the imputation of deism and profaneness. 
Even in his own family, and to his wife 
Terentia, whom he highly trusted, he was 
willing to appear a devout religionist; and 
there remains a letter, addressed to her, in 
which he seriously desires her to offer 
sacrifices to Apollo and Aesculapius, in 
gratitude for the recovery of health.44 
Although Renaissance neoclassicists—like 
their eighteenth-century counterparts—were 
criticized by some contemporaries as “pagan 
worshipers” and atheists, such claims were on 
the whole unjustified.45 On the contrary, they 
sought to achieve what Aby Warburg refers to 
as a “plastische Ausgleichsformel” (flexible 
compromise formula) between Christian faith 
and classical values.46 Erasmus illustrated his 
deep investment in reconciling progressive 
epicurean values and Christian beliefs in his 
1533 colloquy The Epicurean:  
If people who live agreeably are Epicureans, 
none are more truly Epicurean than the 
righteous and godly. And if it is names that 
bother us, no one better deserves the name of 
Epicurean than the revered founder and head 
																																																								
44 David Hume, Four Dissertations: I. The Natural 
History of Religion. II. Of the Passions. III. Of Tragedy. IV. 
Of the Standard of Taste (London: A. Miller, 1757), 81–82. 
45 Paul Oskar Kristeller, Medieval Aspects of Renais-
sance Learning: Three Essays, ed. and trans. E. P. Ma-
honey, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1974), 33–41; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought 
and Its Sources, ed. and trans. Michael Mooney (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1979), esp. 78. 
46 Aby Warburg identifies a “plastic [or flexible] 
compromise formula” between faith in God (Gott-
vertrauen) and faith in one’s self (Selbstvertrauen) in the 
generation of Francesco Sassetti and Giovanni Rucellai. 
“Francesco Sassettis letztwillige Verfügung,” in Gesam-
melte Schriften (Leipzig: Bibliothek Warburg, 1932), 1: 
151–57.  
of the Christian philosophy, Christ, for in 
Greek pikouros means ‘helper’. He alone, 
when the law of Nature was all but blotted 
out by sins, when the law of Moses incited to 
lusts rather than cured them, when Satan 
ruled in the world unchallenged, brought 
timely aid to perishing humanity. Completely 
mistaken, therefore, are those who talk in 
their foolish fashion about Christ’s having 
been sad and gloomy in character and calling 
upon us to follow a dismal mode of life. On 
the contrary, he alone shows the most 
enjoyable life of all and the one most full of 
true pleasure.47 
Like Erasmus, most Renaissance humanists 
sought reform of religion, education, and 
society from within the institutions and values 
of their Christian faith; their engagements 
with (and reconstitution of) classical values 
reflect this agenda. This aspect of Renaissance 
humanism—namely, the alignment of human-
centered values and faith-based values—was 
carried forth in the soundly Christian German 
and Austrian Enlightenments, not least 
through the Jesuit education system.48  Leo-
pold’s decade-long Jesuit training had incul-
cated him with a humanist commitment to 
both reason and faith that had defined the 
spirit of the Renaissance.  
Leopold’s Humanist Education 
Leopold’s neo-Renaissance humanism was 
rooted in his Jesuit education. Educational 
policy and reform are among the greatest 
legacies of the Jesuit Order, the curriculum of 
which was detailed in a comprehensive 
manual titled Ratio atque institutio studiorum 
Societatis Jesu, or The Method and System of the 
Studies of the Society of Jesus. This curriculum was 
																																																								
47 Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus, The Epicurean 
(1533); repr. in Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 43 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 1086.  
48 On Christianity in the German Enlightenment, 
see Beales, “Christians and Philosophes,” 79–82.  
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completed in 1599 (following preliminary 
versions of 1586 and 1589), and its use was 
mandatory in Jesuit schools (with some 
regional variation permitted) until the tem-
porary suppression of the society in 1773. The 
Jesuit curriculum is indebted to the pro-
gressive University of Paris (where St. Ignatius 
and the other founders of the Jesuit Order 
studied) and the humanistic schools of the 
Netherlands (where they frequently travel-
ed).49 Humanism and theology were united in 
the Jesuit educational philosophy, as clearly 
articulated in the 1586 Ratio’s statement of 
purpose: 
The Society of Jesus conducts schools first, 
because they supply man with many advan-
tages for practical living; secondly, because 
they contribute to the right government of 
public affairs and to the proper making of 
laws; third, because they give ornament, 
splendor and perfection to the rational nature 
of man; and fourth, and what is most 
important, because they are the bulwark of 
religion and guide man most surely and easily 
to the achievement of his last end.50 
In the succinct words of J. J. Chambliss, Jesuit 
education was thus designed to combine the 
																																																								
49 Gabriel Codina, “The Modus Parisiensis,” in The 
Jesuit Ratio Studiorum: 400th Anniversary Perspectives, ed., 
Vincent J. Duminuco (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2000), 28-49; Robert Schwickerath, Jesuit 
Education: Its History and Principles Viewed in the Light of 
Modern Educational Problems (St. Louis: Becktold, 1903), 
44 and 141. On humanistic education in Renaissance 
Netherlands, see Juan Luis Vives’s 1531 treatise De 
disciplinis libri XX; trans. Foster Watson as Vives’s On 
Education: A Translation of the De trandendis disciplinis of 
Juan Luis Vives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1913); Vives, Linguae latinae exercitatio (1539); 
trans. Foster Watson as Tudor School-Boy Life: The 
Dialogues of Juan Luis Vives (London: Dent, 1908). 
50 Societas Jesu, Monumenta paedagogica Societatis Jesu, 
7 vols. (Rome, 1965–92), 2: 528–29; cited in John W. 
Padberg, “Development of the Ratio Studiorum,” in 
The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum: 400th Anniversary Perspectives, 
ed. Vincent J. Duminuco (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2000), 98. 
“practical, the social, the humanistic, and the 
religious aims . . . that flowed from the 
principles set down by Ignatius.”51  
 The foundation of the Jesuit curriculum, 
as outlined in the Ratio, was the study of the 
ancient Greek and Roman texts. A founding 
Jesuit educator in Germany, Jacobus Pon-
tanus, famously remarked, “Without classical 
education the other branches of study are 
cold, dumb, and dead; classical learning gives 
these other studies life, breath, motion, blood, 
and language.”52  
 As dictated by the Ratio, students pro-
gressed through a program in the studia inferiora, 
or humanities, that emphasized grammar, 
eloquence, and rhetoric through careful and 
studied engagement with classical texts. Greek 
and Latin reading and comprehension were 
acquired through the study of Cicero, Caesar, 
Lucian, Virgil, and others, such that, upon 
completion of the third grammatical tier, 
students had thoroughly studied the poems of 
Ovid, fables of Aesop, dialogues of Lucian, 
and—through every stage of study—the 
epistles, orations, and other writings of 
Cicero.53 Cicero was indeed the focus of the 
entire classical training, and the centrality of his 
oeuvre became increasingly pronounced as 
students progressed beyond sheer grammar 
(though style and content were implicitly 
engaged through the material) and into the 
study of rhetoric. Cicero was supplemented by 
Quintilian, Aristotle, and—though to a lesser 
																																																								
51 Duminuco, ed., The Jesuit Ratio, 300. 
52  From a memorandum extracted in Johannes 
Janssen, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes, vol. 8 (Freiburg 
im Breisgau: Herder, 1904), 100–103; cited and trans. in 
Schwickerath, Jesuit Education, 111. 
53 Society of Jesus, Ratio atque institutio studiorum 
Societatis Jesu (1599), repr. (Antwerp: Apud Joannem 
Meursium, 1635); trans. Allan P. Farrell as The Jesuit 
Ratio Studiorum of 1599 (Washington, D.C.: Conference 
of Major Superiors of Jesuits, 1970); see also 
Schwickerath, Jesuit Education, 107–43. 
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extent—vernacular authors on whom students 
could form erudition “derived from the history 
and manners of nations.”54   
 Although here, as elsewhere, specific cur-
ricular components varied,55 Ciceronian clas-
sicism remained the staple of the entire Jesuit 
educational system. Leopold’s eight years at 
the gymnasium (1727–35) and his subsequent 
year at the adjoining lyceum in Augsburg (not 
to mention his university studies at the 
Benedictine University of Salzburg, which, 
though not a Jesuit school, was based on 
Italian models and—particularly in Leopold’s 
chosen degree areas of philosophy and 
jurisprudence—would have provided further 
training in the classics 56 ) ensured that he 
received regular exposure to humanist-
oriented neoclassicism during his formative 
educational years. 
 This is not to say that Leopold was a 
model student. On the contrary, the six-year 
course of study at gymnasium took him eight 
years to complete (albeit magna cum laude); 
though the reasons for his delay are unknown, 
an Augsburg schoolmate provides a picture of 
a disenchanted and/or rebellious youth. 57 
Franziskus Erasmus Freysinger’s diary reports 
of Leopold, “Ah, he was a great fellow. My 
father thought the world of him. And how he 
hoodwinked the clerics about becoming a 
																																																								
54 Schwickerath, Jesuit Education, 120. 
55 See, for example, Father Kropf’s regional plan 
for Jesuit schools in upper Germany, “Ratio et via,” 
Bibliothek der katholischen Pädogogik 10 (1736): 340–48; 
cited in Schwickerath, Jesuit Education, 121. 
56 On the Italianate humanities curriculum at the 
Benedictine University of Salzburg, see Agostino 
Sottili, Humanismus und Universitätsbesuch: Die Wirkung 
italienischer Universitäten auf die Studia Humanitatis nördlich 
der Alpen, eds. Jürgen Miethke, William J. Courtenay, 
Jeremy Catto, and Jacques Verger (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
2006), 108, 290–91, and 398; cited in Kreyszig, 
“Leopold Mozart,” 56. 
57 Solomon, Mozart, 22–23. 
priest!”58 His two subsequent failed academic 
pursuits—at the St. Salvator Lyceum, from 
which he withdrew before the end of his first 
year (upon the death of his father), and then 
at the University of Salzburg, where his poor 
attendance and apparent indifference to his 
studies led to his expulsion—rendered him, 
according to the rector at the latter university, 
“unworthy of the name of student.”59    
 Nor is this to say that Leopold’s Jesuit 
education rendered him a faithful member of 
the Jesuit Order, for the few references to the 
Society of Jesus in his correspondence, 
though sympathetic, reveal no overt allegian-
ces. Be this as it may, it is clear that Leopold’s 
education was centered on humanistic studies 
and, specifically, classic Greek and Roman 
texts; that his particular shade of rationalism is 
best understood in light of his internalization 
of humanist philosophy, aesthetics, and ethics; 
and that these humanist values and beliefs 
																																																								
58 As reported by Wolfgang in a letter to Maria 
Anna, “Ja, ein ganzer Mann. bey meinem Vattern galt 
er sehr viell. und wie er die Pfaffen herum gefopt hat, 
wegen den geistlich werden.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., 
Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2: 48; trans. Anderson, Letters, 
307; cited in Solomon, Mozart, 23. 
59 “D. Johan. Georg Mozart August Suevus, qui ab 
anni, civilis scilicet, initio vix una vel bina vice 
Physicam frequentavit, et ideo se ipsum nomine 
studiosi indignum reddidit: fuit is paucis ante examen 
diebus citatus ad Magnificum, ubi sententiam percepit, 
se non amplius in numero studiosorum habendum esse, 
quam sententiam nullis interpostis precibus, ac si hoec 
non curaret, acceptavit e discessit; qua de ratione ne 
que ad examen amplius fuit citatus” (Don Johann 
Georg Mozart, a Swabian of Augsburg, has from the 
beginning of the civil year hardly attended Natural 
Science more than once or twice, and has thereby 
rendered himself unworthy of the name of student. A 
few days before the examination he was called before 
the Dean and informed that henceforth he would no 
longer be numbered among the students. Having heard 
this sentence, he offered no appeals, accepted the 
sentence, and departed as if indifferent; therefore he 
was not called for further examination). Cited in Latin 
and English in Erich Schenk, Mozart and His Times 
(Vienna, 1955), ed. and trans. Richard and Clara 
Winston (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 12. 
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were accommodated, and further, endorsed 
by the keepers of his faith.  
 The influence of Ciceronian classicism is 
most prominent in Leopold’s writings in the 
slippery and capacious concept of taste. Five 
central aspects of Leopold’s aesthetic ideal of 
taste emerge from his personal and profes-
sional writings: moderation, clarity, propriety, 
expression, and ornamentation. These corres-
pond to the teachings of Cicero and thus 
point to the complementary relationship be-
tween Leopold’s religious education and his 
enlightened philosophy of art. The Ciceronian 
framework, reflected in Leopold’s writings, 
promotes reason beyond rules—reason born 
of wisdom and experience and fitted to 
navigate uncertain situations that may defy a 
predetermined ideal. Taste, itself frequently 
associated with dogma and rules, is here 
revealed as a counterpoint to them and a 
keystone to Leopold’s humanistic shade of 
rationalism. 
Taste as Wisdom 
Taste in Leopold’s system is, prima facie, the 
province of rules. In the preface to his 
Versuch, for example, he states emphatically 
that “[there] is still much to be dealt with. . . 
such matters as the lighting of a beacon to 
guide the weak judgment of many a concert 
performer and, by means of the rules of good 
taste, to form an intelligent soloist.” 60 One 
such rule concerns overdotting, which Leo-
pold promotes in slow pieces to awaken an 
otherwise “sleepy” passage:61 
																																																								
60  “Es ist noch vieles abzuhandeln übrig. . . . 
Solche, die nur dazu gehören der schlechten Beur-
theilungskraft manches Concertisten ein Licht anzu-
zänden, und durch Regeln des guten Geschmackes 
einen vernünftigen Solospieler zu bilden.” Leopold 
Mozart, Versuch, Vorbericht; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 8. 
61  “schläferig.” Mozart, Versuch, 39; trans. 
Knocker, Treatise, 41. Overdotting refers to the 
Not only is the performance thereby en-
livened, but hurrying—that almost universal 
fault—is thereby checked. . . . It would be a 
good thing if this long retention of the dot 
were insisted on, and set down as a rule. I, at 
least, have often done so, and I have made 
clear my opinion of the right manner of 
performance by setting down two dots 
followed by a shortened note. It is true that at 
first it looks strange to the eye. But what 
matters this? The point has its reason and 
musical taste is promoted thereby.62  
A rationalist promotion of rules permeates 
Leopold’s Versuch, which presents an ob-
jective and exacting prescription for violin 
playing and—on the surface, at least—a rule-
based concept of good taste. Although 
Leopold’s apparent emphasis on rules pre-
sents much fodder for his characterization as 
a Gottschedian rationalist, upon closer exami-
nation Leopold’s rationalism is far from 
rigorist; rather, he employs rules as part of a 
system that emphasizes taste and judgment 
born of time and experience and equipped to 
manage various, indeterminate situations that 
may defy a single, predetermined ideal.  
 For Leopold, rules such as that concer-
ning overdotting, cited above, do not alone 
lead to a successful performance:  
For not only must one observe exactly all that 
has been marked and prescribed and not play 
it otherwise than as written, but one must 
throw oneself into the affect to be expressed 
																																																																																			
performance practice of extending the duration of 
dotted notes. 
62  “Denn nicht nur wird dadurch der Vortrag 
lebhafter; sondern es wird auch dem Eilen, jenem fast 
allgemeinen Fehler, Einhalt gethan. . . . Es wäre sehr 
gut, wenn diese längere Aushaltung des Puncts recht 
bestimmet und hingesetzet würde. Ich wenigstens habe 
es schon oft gethan, und meine Vortragsmeinung habe 
ich mit zweenen Punten nebst Abkürzung der darauf 
folgenden Note also zu Tage geleget. Es ist wahr, 
anfangs fällt es fremd in die Augen. Allein was 
verschlägt dieß? Der Satz hat seinen Grund; und der 
musikalische Geschmack wird dadurch beförderet.” 
Mozart, Versuch, 39–40; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 41–42. 
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and apply and execute in a certain good style 
all the ties, slides, accentuation of the notes, 
the forte and piano; in a word, whatever 
belongs to tasteful performance of a piece; 
which can only be learned from sound 
judgment and long experience.63  
It is precisely this judgment that distinguishes 
the technically skilled soloist from the more 
versatile and better-equipped orchestral play-
er. For Leopold, who was himself an orches-
tral violinist, the former need only “get 
everything well in tune. . . . A solo player can, 
without great understanding of music, usually 
play his concertos tolerably—even with 
distinction—but a good orchestral violinist 
must have great insight into the whole art of 
musical composition and into the differences 
of style.”64  
 Such “understanding” and “insight” are 
not to be taken lightly, for although many 
“believe themselves to be doing well if they 
embellish and befrill a piece right foolishly out 
of their own heads, and . . . have no 
sensitiveness whatever for the affect, which is 
to be expressed in the piece,”65 the “dexterity” 
																																																								
63 “Denn man muß nicht nur alles angemerkte und 
vorgeschriebene genau beobachten, und nicht anders, 
als wie es hingesetzet ist abspielen; sondern man muß 
auch mit einer gewissen Empfindlichkeit spielen; man 
muß sich in den Affect setzen, der auszudrücken ist; 
und man muß alle die Züge, die Schleifer, das 
Abstossen der Noten, das Schwache und Starke, und, 
mit einem Worte, alles was immer zum schmackhaften 
Vortrage eines Stückes gehöret, auf eine gewisse gute 
Art anbringen und vortragen, die man nicht anders, als 
mit gesunder Beurtheilungskraft durch eine lange 
Erfahrniß erlernet.” Mozart, Versuch, 253; trans. 
Knocker, Treatise, 216.  
64 “zu Hause üben um alles rein herauszubringen. . 
. . Ein Solospieler kann ohne grosse Einsicht in die 
Musik überhaupts seine Concerte erträglich, ja auch mit 
Ruhme abspielen; wenn er nur einen reinen Vortrag 
hat; ein guter Orchestergeiger aber muß viele Einsicht 
in die ganze Musik, in die Setzkunst und in die 
Verschiedenheit der Characters.” Mozart, Versuch, 254; 
trans. Knocker, Treatise, 217.  
65 “die sehr wohl zu thun glauben, wenn sie ein 
Stück nach ihrem Kopfe recht närrisch verzieren und 
and virtuosity that they may exhibit in an 
allegro cannot compensate for the “ignorance 
and bad judgment in every bar” of a more 
expressively demanding adagio.66 It thus fol-
lows that, for Leopold, perception and acuity 
born of “long experience and good judgment” 
are to be counted “among the chiefest per-
fections in the art of music.”67 
 Taste, as a form of judgment that 
complements (rather than solely adhering to) 
the rules, pertains to several performance 
situations outlined in Leopold’s Versuch. First, 
taste must compensate for inadequacies of 
contemporary notation—such as the deter-
mination of the “natural speed” of a phrase 
that, though indicated with descriptive adjec-
tives, is “impossible . . . to describe in an exact 
manner.”68  
 Second, even when precise notation is 
available, taste compensates for “would-be 
composers . . . [who] either will not indicate 
the style of a good performance, or ‘put a 
patch to the side of the hole.’”69  
 A third category of situations concerns 
expressive nuances of music, which require 
																																																																																			
verkräuseln; und die von demjenigen Affecte ganz 
keine Empfindung haben, der in dem Stücke soll 
ausgedrücket werden.” Mozart, Versuch, 252; trans. 
Knocker, Treatise, 215. 
66 “rechtschaffen”; “Unwissenheit und ihre schlech-
te Beurtheilungskraft in allen Täcten.” Mozart, Versuch, 
252–53; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 215. Leopold’s compa-
rison of orchestral and solo players also reflects his 
distrust of “empty virtuosity.” Knocker, Treatise, xxiv.  
67  “lange Erfahrung, und eine gute Beur-
theilungskraft”; “unter die ersten Vollkommenheiten 
der Tonkunst zähle.” Mozart, Versuch, 30; trans. 
Knocker, Treatise, 33.  
68  “natürliche Bewegung”; “so kann er doch 
unmöglich jene Art auf das genaueste bestimmen.” 
Mozart, Versuch, 30; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 33.  
69 “Halbcomponisten . . . die selbst die Art eines 
guten Vortrags entweder nicht anzuzeigen wissen, oder 
den Fleck neben das Loch setzen.” Putting a patch “to 
the side of,” rather than over, a hole, refers to applying 
nonsensical and ineffectual solutions. Mozart, Versuch, 
136; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 124. 
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taste in the translation of verbal adjectives to 
sounding expressive effects.  
 Fourth, taste pertains to moments of 
implied or prescribed subjectivity. With res-
pect to the fermata, for example, “It is true 
that such sustaining is to be made according 
to fancy, but it must be neither too short nor 
too long, and made with sound judgment.”70  
 For Leopold, then, good taste resides not 
merely in adherence to accepted, predeter-
mined rules, but further, in the ability to 
successfully fill the gaps between their verbal 
prescriptions and actualized music.  
 Even genius cannot compensate for the 
taste and judgment born of time, education, 
and experience. Leopold, while acknow-
ledging his son’s God-granted gifts, neverthe-
less admonishes twenty-two-year-old Wolf-
gang thus:  
It is better that whatever does you no honour, 
should not be given to the public. That is the 
reason why I have not given any of your 
symphonies to be copied, because I suspect 
that when you are older and have more 
insight, you will be glad that no one has got 
hold of them, though at the time you 
composed them you were quite pleased with 
them. One gradually becomes more and more 
fastidious.71  
Leopold’s meaning is clear. As he states 
elsewhere, that which “belongs to the tasteful 
performance of a piece” resides beyond the 
																																																								
70  “Ein solches Aushalten wird zwar nach 
Gutdünken gemacht: doch muß es nicht zu kurz und 
nicht zu lang, sondern mit guter Beurtheilung 
geschehen.” Mozart, Versuch, 45; trans. Knocker, Trea-
tise, 46. 
71 “Was dir keine Ehre macht ist besser wenns 
nicht bekannt wird, desswegen habe von Deinen 
Sinfonien nichts hergegeben, weil ich vorauswuste, daß 
Du mit reiffern Jahren, wo die Einsicht wächst, frohe 
seyn wirst, daß sie niemand hat, wenn Du gleich 
damals, als Du sie schriebst, damit zufrieden warest. 
Man wird immer heickler.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., 
Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2: 485; trans. Anderson, Letters, 
619. 
individual provinces of genius and theory (i.e., 
rules) alone, and “can only be learnt through 
sound judgment and long experience.”72  
 This association of right judgment with 
acquired wisdom (rather than learned, ex-
trinsic rules) was a fundamental tenet of 
Ciceronian humanism and likewise served as 
the foundation of Leopold’s Jesuit training. 
The three books of Cicero’s De oratore, which 
are devoted to the attributes of the ideal 
orator, emphasize time and again the im-
portance of acquiring knowledge and skills 
that transcend the narrow rules of the art 
form.73 It thus follows that the purpose of 
Cicero’s pedagogy is not to provide a rigid 
model of objective and correct practice, for, 
as with Leopold, rules cannot accommodate 
the more nuanced aspects of oratory. 74  Its 
purpose is rather “to reveal . . . the springs 
from which to drink and the approaches to 
them, not as one seeking to be myself your 
guide (an endless and superfluous task), but 
just indicating the road, and, in the usual way, 
pointing with my finger to the fountains.”75 
As with Leopold, these subtler skills are born 
of time and experience, and thus elude one 
such as the young (and admittedly talented) 
Sulpicius:  
And so, Catulus, to begin with our friend 
here, I first heard Sulpicius, when he was 
almost a boy, in a petty case: as to intonation, 
presence, bearing and the other essentials he 
was well fitted for this function we are 
investigating, but his delivery was rapid and 
																																																								
72 “alles was immer zum schmackhaften Vortrage 
eines Stückes gehöret”; “die man nicht anders, als mit 
gesunder Beurtheilungskraft durch eine lange Erfahrniß 
erlernet.” Mozart, Versuch, 253; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 
216. 
73 See, for example, Cicero, On the Orator, 2 vols., 
Loeb Classical Library, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. 
Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1942); repr. (London: William Heinemann, 1959), 2: 59.  
74 Ibid., 1: 235. 
75 Ibid., 1: 143. 
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impetuous—the result of his genius—his 
diction agitated and a little too exuberant, as 
was natural at his age. I did not underrate him, 
being well content that luxuriance should exalt 
itself in the youthful, for, as with vines it is 
easier to cut back the branches which have 
shot out too riotously than to produce new 
growths by cultivation from a feeble stock, 
even so in a young man I want something to 
prune, because the sap can never live long in 
anything which has ripened too early.76  
Extending the agricultural metaphor, Cicero 
thus claimed to require “talent which has been 
cultivated, soil, as it were, not of a single 
ploughing, but both broken and given a 
second ploughing so as to be capable of 
bearing better and more abundant produce. 
And the cultivation is practice, listening, 
reading and written composition.”77  
 Cicero reverberates in Leopold’s writings: 
good taste is a form of judgment that incor-
porates rules, to be sure, but complements 
them with wisdom born of time, education, 
and experience and fitted to navigate nuanced 
situations that theory alone cannot sufficiently 
address.  
The Civic Dimension of Taste 
Leopold’s emphasis on acquired wisdom is 
rooted in the casuistical reasoning that formed 
the basis of Aristotle’s philosophy of ethics 
and emerged as a central feature of later 
Roman philosophy as well. For the Greek 
philosopher,  
everything said on moral subjects ought to be 
said in outline, and not with exactness. . . . But 
if the treatment of the subject generally is of 
this nature, still less does it admit of exactness 
in particulars; for it comes under no art or set 
of precepts, but is the duty of the agents 
themselves to look to the circumstances of 
																																																								
76 Ibid., 1: 265. 
77 Ibid., 1: 293. 
the occasion, just as is the case in the arts of 
medicine and navigation.78  
Aristotle resounded in Cicero’s Rome, where 
skepticism, analysis, and dialogue were 
identified with a “rational way of life” and—
implicitly—a healthy, productive society.79 
 Drawing on these classical texts, a student 
of the Society of Jesus was thus “an honest 
and learned man [who] regards as surely 
probable an opinion that he has carefully 
examined, and which he believes to be true, or 
surely probable, for serious motives, when he 
judges it aside from all irregular passion.”80  
 Such judgment was not only dispas-
sionate; it was also the product of highly 
developed skills of moral and intellectual 
reasoning, which formed a central component 
of the Jesuit educational system. 81  For, as 
elsewhere, rules cannot accommodate all 
ethical situations; wisdom born of knowledge 
and experience thus constitutes—according to 
this system—the engine of reason and the 
basis of a practical, aesthetic, and civic ideal.  
 Given the premium placed on acquired 
wisdom, it is fitting that after vowing purity of 
conscience, Jesuit students were asked “to 
keep firm and constant their resolution to 
apply themselves to their studies.”82 As the 
Ratio attests, the act of studying, of molding 
																																																								
78 The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, trans. R. W. 
Browne (London: George Bell and Sons, 1889), 36.  
79 John Higginbotham, On Moral Obligation: A New 
Translation of Cicero’s De Officiis, with Introduction and 
Notes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 
101. 
80 Paul Bert, Jean Pierre Gury, J. G. Settler, and 
Pierre Rousselot, The Doctrine of the Jesuits (Boston: B. F. 
Bradbury, 1880), 67. 
 81  See, for example, Maryks’s discussion of the 
lectures on Cases of Conscience as prescribed by the 
Ratio Studiorum. Robert Aleksander Maryks, Saint Cicero 
and the Jesuits: The Influence of the Liberal Arts on the 
Adoption of Moral Probabilism (Hampshire, England: 
Ashgate, 2008), 84–88. 
82 The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum of 1599, trans. Farrell, 95. 
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the thinking mind, was not merely an intel-
lectual pursuit; in its promise to produce 
citizens of wisdom and right judgment, it was 
also a moral, religious, and civic imperative of 
the Jesuit Catholic faith.  
 Leopold’s rationalism is likewise inflected 
toward a greater civic ideal. In the dedicatory 
letter to Prince Siegmund Christoph Schrat-
tenbach, Leopold associates the pedagogical 
aim of his Versuch—namely, the promotion of 
good taste in music—with the improvement 
of the citizenry and society as a whole:  
How many young people, often endowed with 
the fairest gifts of Nature, would have grown 
to maturity, untended as the seedlings run 
wild in the forest, if your right fatherly help 
had not in good time brought them under the 
supervision of judicious persons for their 
upbringing? And how many would have had, 
in the increase of their years, to famish in 
want and poverty and to be a burden on the 
community as useless citizens of the world, if 
Your Grace had not graciously provided 
instruction in this or that path of knowledge, 
according to their talent and ability? Young 
people of both sexes and of all ranks can 
boast of this kindness: a kindness . . . which 
lives on in the memory of whole generations 
[for whom] the kindest of Princes grasped 
their great-grandfather by the arm and raised 
him to a position whereby through his 
knowledge he . . . was able to help his fellow 
citizens and after his death still to be useful to 
his descendants. 
 I may, therefore, surely venture to 
present to Your Grace in deepest loyalty, a 
book in which I have endeavoured, according 
to my poor powers, to pave a way for music-
loving youth which shall guide them with 
certainty to good taste in music.83  
																																																								
83  “Wie viele junge Leute / welche oft die 
schönsten Natursgaben hatten / würden gleich den im 
Walde verwilderten Reisern unbesorgt aufgewachsen 
seyn; wenn Dero recht väterliche Hülfe sie nicht bey 
Zeiten unter die Aussicht vernünftiger Personen zur 
Erziehung gebracht hätte. Und wie viele müßten seiner 
Zeit bey dem Anwachse der Jahren vor Noth und 
 The taste and erudition to which Leopold 
so frequently alludes are acquired attributes 
that serve an intellectual, as well as greater 
civic and humanistic, agenda.  
 This agenda is also exhibited in Leopold’s 
correspondence. In an admittedly obscure 
remark to Lorenz Hagenauer, Leopold refers 
to his having “transformed beasts into 
men,”84 invoking a popular binary between 
instinctive/appetitive and cultivated/intel-
lective concepts of taste. The Comte de 
Buffon, Georges Louis Leclerc, was one of a 
number of eighteenth-century authors to give 
this binary fuller treatment: 
The animals have only one mode for 
acquiring pleasure, the exercise of their 
sensations to gratify their desires. We also 
possess this faculty; but we are endowed with 
another source of pleasure, the exercise of the 
mind, the appetite of which is the desire of 
knowledge. . . . Uninterrupted passion is 
madness; and madness is the death of the 
soul.85  
																																																																																			
Armuth darben / und als unnütze Weltbürger der 
Gemeinde zur Beschwerniß seyn; wenn euer 
hochfürstl. Gnaden solche nicht nach dem Unterscheid 
ihres Talents und ihrer Geschicklichkeit in dieser oder 
jener Wissenschaft hätten gnädigst unterweisen lassen. 
Die Jugend beyderley Geschlechtes und von allen 
Ständen hat sich dieser Gnade zu rühmen: einer Gnade 
. . . durch ganze Geschlechtregister in lebendigem 
Andenken . . . der gütigste Fürst ihrem Urgroßvater 
unter die Arme gegriffen und ihn in den Stand gesetzet 
hätte durch seine erlernete Wissenschaft im Leben 
seinen Mitbürgern / und nach dem Tode auch noch 
seinen Nachfolgern nützlich zu seyn. 
“Ich darf es demnach sicher wagen Euer 
hochfürstl. Gnaden ein Buch in tiefester 
Unterthänigkeit zu überreichen / in welchem ich mich 
nach meinen wenigen Kräften beflissen habe der 
Musikliebenden Jugend einen Weg zu bahnen / der sie 
ganz sicher nach dem guten Geschmacke in der 
Tonkunst führet.” Mozart, Versuch, “Zuschrift”; trans. 
Knocker, Treatise, 6.  
84 “habe . . . Bestien in Menschen verwandelt.” 
Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 1: 
260; trans. Anderson, Letters, 84. 
85  “Les animaux n’ont qu’un moyen d’avoir du 
plaisir, c’est d’exercer leur sentiment pour satisfaire leur 
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 As this passage suggests, much was at 
stake in claims of good taste; for the 
cultivation of the intellect was tied to the 
suppression of the instinct’s various appetites, 
wherein harbored madness and anarchy. The 
man of taste thus emblematized a civic ideal 
and a defense against an alternative—and, for 
many, frightening—social reality.  
 It may come as no surprise, then, that the 
frontispiece of Leopold’s Versuch presents an 
engraved portrait of its author that melds the 
image of the artist to that of the eighteenth-
century man of taste (Fig. 1). The distinction 
that comes with age is subtly conveyed in his 
hair, complexion, and noble, grave expression. 
His knowledge and skill are emphasized in 
both the compositions of various types, 
strewn about, and the violin in his hands 
(whose diminutive size elevates his own 
relative stature). Achievement and success are 
suggested by his gentleman’s wardrobe and 
wig; and yet his presence—direct gaze, seated 
position, and partially unbuttoned vest—is 
unpretentious, unguarded, and direct. This 
image thus recommends the work that it 
introduces by portraying its author as a man 
of age, knowledge, and achievement; and the 
two aspects of taste—the aesthetic and the 
greater social/civic—merge into one mutually 
reinforcing characterization.  
 The Latin epigraph—playing, as it does, 
on the intersection between performative and 
social aspects of gesture—renders the 
portrait’s meaning explicit: “Therefore it is 
																																																																																			
appétit: nous avons cette même faculté, & nous avons 
de plus un autre moyen de plaisir, c’est d’exercer notre 
esprit, dont l’appétit est de savoir. . . . Une passion sans 
intervalles est démence, & l’état de démence est pour 
l’ame un état de mort.” M. Le Comte de Buffon, 
Histoire naturelle, générale et particuliere, Nouvelle Éd., 
Tome Premier (Lausanne: J. P. Heubach, 1784), 48–49; 
trans. William Smellie as Natural History, General and 
Particular, by the Count de Buffon, 9 vols. (London: A. 
Strahan and T. Cadell, 1791), 3: 242–43.  
appropriate that there is neither conspicuous 
charm nor indecency in gesture, lest we 
appear to be either actors or people who work 
for hire.”86  
 All of this evidence points to a concept of 
taste that incorporated aesthetic, cultural, and 
even political dimensions; the cultivation of 
taste went hand in hand with the cultivation 
of a society of virtuous, industrious, and up-
right citizens.  
 
 
Figure 1. Leopold Mozart (1719–87), engraving by Jakob 
Andreas Friedrich, after Matthias Gottfried Eichler, 
1756. Frontispiece to Leopold’s Versuch. Public domain, 
accessed September 26, 2017, https://commons.wiki-
media.org/w/index.php?curid=4138760.  
Moderation as a Tenet of Taste 
Nowhere does the influence of Ciceronian 
humanism surface more prominently than in 
Leopold’s frequent references to moderation. 
For Leopold, good taste seeks the “middle 
																																																								
86 “Convenit igitur . . . in gestu nec venustatem 
conspicuam nec turpitudinem esse, ne aut histriones 
aut operarii videamur esse.” 
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ground” in nearly all performance situations. 
Of the trill that cues the end of a cadenza, for 
example, Leopold argues that  
there is nothing in worse taste than in a 
cadenza, where one is not tied to strict time, 
to break off the trill so abruptly and 
unexpectedly that the ears of the listeners are 
more offended than entertained. . . . 
Therefore the middle road must be chosen, 
and a trill must be made which comes closest 
to good taste.87 
 In his discussion of tempo indications, 
Leopold’s allegiance to the middle ground 
reaches almost comic proportions. Admit-
tedly, performance indications referred as 
much to the character of a piece as to its 
tempo; however, where tempo was a factor, 
other theorists permitted a variety that 
Leopold denied in the service of “the middle 
ground.” Though it is fitting that moderato 
should indicate a tempo “neither too fast nor 
too slow,”88 vivace, spiritoso, and animoso also 
suggest “the mean between quick and slow,”89 
and tempo commodo and tempo giusto likewise “tell 
us that we must play it neither too fast nor 
too slowly, but in a proper, convenient, and 
																																																								
87  The full passage reads: “Es ist auch nichts 
abgeschmackters, als wenn bey einer Cadenze, wo man 
an das Zeitmaaß nicht gebunden ist, der Triller so 
schnell und unerwart abgebrochen wird, daß die Ohren 
der Zuhörer mehr beleidiget als belustiget werden. Es 
wird in solchem Falle dem Gehör etwas entrissen; und 
man bleibt eben deßwegen unvergnügt, weil man noch 
eine längere Aushaltung erwartet hat: gleichwie es den 
Zuhörern gewiß ungemein hart fällt, wenn sie den 
Mangel des Athems an einem Singer bemerken. Doch 
ist auch nichts lächerlicheres, als ein über die Maase 
langer Triller. Man gehe demnach den mittern Weeg, 
und mache einen solchen Triller, welcher dem guten 
Geschmacke am nächsten kömmt.” Mozart, Versuch, 
221–22; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 190. 
88  “nicht zu geschwind und nicht zu langsam.” 
Mozart, Versuch, 49; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 50. 
89  “das Mittel zwischen dem Geschwinden und 
Langsamen.” Ibid. 
natural tempo.” 90  Even allegro suggests to 
Leopold a “cheerful, though not too hurried 
tempo.”91  
 This last passage hints at the larger 
aesthetic-ethical compass of moderation, which 
condemns hurrying, exaggeration, and incon-
sistency—markers of the irrationality and 
untempered passion that good taste (and good 
conduct) condemn. With respect to overdot-
ting, Leopold would thus have the performer 
err on the side of restraint, holding the dot 
“rather too long than too briefly. In this 
manner hurrying is avoided and good taste 
promoted.”92  
 Consistency—which moderates impul-
sivity—is likewise incorporated into Leopold’s 
humanistic concept of taste. Of ensemble 
playing, he writes: “Many who have no idea of 
taste never retain the evenness of tempo in 
the accompanying of a concerto part, but 
endeavour always to follow the solo-part.”93 
And of bowing a given passage, he writes that 
“not a little is added to evenness and purity of 
tone if you know how to fit much into one 
bow. Yea, it goes against nature if you are 
constantly interrupting and changing. . . . one 
must always approximate to nature as nearly 
as possible.”94  
																																																								
90  “sagen uns daß wir das Stück weder zu ge-
schwind weder zu langsam, sondern in dem eigent-
lichen, gelegenen und natürlichen Tempo spielen 
solen.” Mozart, Versuch, 49; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 50. 
91 “ein lustiges, doch ein nicht übereiltes Tempo.” 
Mozart, Versuch, 48; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 50. 
92 “eher zu lang als zu kurz halten. Dadurch wird 
dem Eilen vorgebogen; und der gute Geschmack wird 
befördert.” Leopold Mozart, Versuch, 145; trans. 
Knocker, Treatise, 130. 
93 “Viele, die von dem Geschmacke keinen Begriff 
haben, wollen bey dem Accompagnement einer 
concertirenden Stimme niemals bey der Gleichheit des 
Tactes bleiben; sondern sie bemühen sich immer der 
Hauptstimme nachzugeben.” Mozart, Versuch, 262; 
trans. Knocker, Treatise, 223. 
94 “Zur Gleichheit und Reinigkeit des Tones trägt 
auch nicht wenig bey, wenn man vieles in einem 
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 As Leopold repeatedly emphasizes, the 
performer who takes nature as his model and 
reason as his guide thus embodies the virtues 
of moderation—consistency, control, and 
restraint—and imbues his music with the 
good taste that they impart. Such virtues are 
to be lauded where they are found—as in 
Michael Haydn’s Hieronymus Mass in C Major, 
which “flows along naturally . . . the themes 
being most natural and without any exag-
gerated progressions or too sudden modu-
lations” 95—and condemned where they are 
found to be lacking, as with the violinist of 
poor taste, who piles appoggiaturas one on 
another, toward an effect that “can surely 
never sound natural but only exaggerated and 
confused.”96  
 Leopold’s aesthetic ideal of moderation 
casts him—in this regard, at least—as the 
consummate neoclassicist. Cicero identified 
moderation with the beauty, consistency, and 
order that are the virtues of his ideal 
humanistic society. 97  Cicero was not alone 
																																																																																			
Bogenstriche weis anzubringen. Ja es läuft wider das 
Natürliche, wenn man immer absetzet und ändert. Ein 
Singer der bey ieder kleinen Figur absetzen, Athem 
holen, und bald diese bald jene Note besonder 
vortragen wollte, würde unfehlbar jedermann zum 
Lachen bewegen. Die menschliche Stimme ziehet sich 
ganz ungezwungen von einem Tone in den andern; und 
ein vernünftiger Singer wird niemal einen Absatz 
machen, wenn es nicht eine besondere Ausdrückung, 
oder die Abschnitte und Einschnitte erfordern. Und 
wer weis denn nicht, daß die Singmusik allezeit das 
Augenwerk aller Instrumentisten seyn soll: weil man 
sich in allen Stücken dem Natürlichen, so viel es immer 
möglich ist, nähern muß?” Mozart, Versuch, 107–08; 
trans. Knocker, Treatise, 101–02. 
95 “Es geht alles natürlich fort . . . die themata 
näturlich, und keine übertriebene modulation oder zu 
gähe Ausweichung angebracht.” Bauer and Deutsch, 
eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2: 96; trans. Anderson, 
Letters, 352. 
96 “nimmer natürlich, sondern schon übertrieben 
und verwirret läßt.” Mozart, Versuch, 195; trans. 
Knocker, Treatise, 168. 
97 Higginbotham, On Moral Obligation, 43; M. T. 
Cicero, in a letter to his brother Quintus, upon the 
among the ancients in promoting moderation; 
on the contrary, he owed his own debt to 
Aristotle, whose definition of stylistic excel-
lence likewise seeks a balance between 
verbosity and curtness, banality and excess.98  
Taste and the Classical Virtues of Style 
Moderation is further suggested in the 
canonical four virtues of style, which grew 
out of Aristotle’s definition of stylistic 
excellence and emerged as a central feature 
of classical aesthetics. The four virtues—
correctness, clarity, ornamentation, and 
propriety—emerge in Leopold’s writings as a 
self-moderating system organized around 
two opposing dyads: clarity and ornamen-
tation, on the one hand, and correctness and 
propriety, on the other.  
 It is no coincidence that Leopold’s 
concept of taste incorporates these four vir-
tues, for they comprise the foundation of 
ancient Roman aesthetics and further arti-
culate the interdependence of ethical and 
aesthetic dimensions, so central to the Jesuit 
educational ideal. 
Clarity and Ornamentation 
In classical aesthetics, oratorical ethics pro-
vided a needed defense against the charges 
associated with moving a listener to persuasion. 
Indeed, the targeting of emotions and impul-
ses was at the root of much criticism directed 
toward rhetoric from antiquity through the 
																																																																																			
duties of a magistrate, in M. T. Cicero, his Offices, or his 
Treatise concerning The Moral Duties of Mankind, his Cato 
Major, concerning The Means of Making Old Age Happy, his 
Laelius, concerning Friendship, his Moral Paradoxes, The 
Vision of Scipio, concerning A Future State, his Letter 
concerning The Duties of a Magistrate, trans. William 
Guthrie (London: T. Waller, 1755), 378. 
98  Aristotle’s Treatise on Rhetoric, 3: 12,6; trans. 
Theodore Buckley (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1857), 
248–49. 
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eighteenth century. This is why Cicero, for 
one, was so intent on grounding the orator’s 
persuasive efforts in deep moral and 
intellectual conviction. Oratory was not to be 
mere manipulation, for “it is impossible for 
the listener to feel indignation, hatred or ill 
will, to be terrified of anything, or reduced to 
tears of compassion, unless all those emotions 
which the advocate would inspire in the 
arbitrator are visibly stamped or rather 
branded on the advocate himself.”99  
 Sincerity thus marked the difference 
between communicative and manipulative 
forms of expression. Communication rests on 
genuine shared experience, while manipu-
lation reduces the speaker’s expressive voca-
bulary to tools and tricks—tricks “that leave 
speeches so muddled up” and “inverted that 
there is no head or tail to them.”100 Through 
such means, “oratory, the proper function of 
which is to throw light on the facts, only 
contributes additional darkness.”101 
 One of Leopold’s most striking charges of 
trickery concerns not music but fashion. He 
writes,  
I really cannot tell you whether the women in 
Paris are fair; for they are painted so 
unnaturally, like the dolls of Berchtesgaden, 
that even a naturally beautiful woman on 
account of this detestable make-up is un-
bearable to the eyes of an honest German.102  
																																																								
99 Ibid., 1: 335. 
100 Ibid., 3: 41. 
101 Ibid. 
102 “Ob die Frauenzimmer in Paris schön sind, kañ 
ich ihnen mit Grund nicht sagen; deñ sie sind wider alle 
Natur, wie die Berchtesgadner Docken, so gemahlt, daß 
auch eine von Natur schöne Person durch diese 
garstige Zierlichkeit den augen eines ehrlichen 
Deutschen unerträglich wird.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., 
Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 1: 121; trans. Anderson, Letters, 
33–34. Wood carvers in eighteenth-century Berch-
tesgaden made fashionable dolls, doll beds, and other 
wooden toys. 
In invoking honesty, Leopold articulates the 
Ciceronian line between persuasion and 
deception that informs not only his taste in 
fashion but in music as well. Indeed, the 
deception that he perceives in la mode of 
Parisian fashion is nothing short of criminal 
when applied to music:  
Many imagine themselves to have brought 
something wonderfully beautiful into the 
world if they befrill the notes of an Adagio 
Cantabile thoroughly, and make out of one 
note a couple of dozen. Such note-murderers 
expose thereby their bad judgment to the 
light, and tremble when they have to sustain a 
long note or play only a few notes singingly, 
without inserting their usual preposterous and 
laughable frippery.103  
Such frippery cannot compete with the pure 
and clear sentiment expressed in, for example, 
a “beautiful” beggars’ duet in fifths. 104  For 
Leopold, as for his classical exemplars, clarity 
is the primary defense against and antidote to 
the potential abuse of the persuasive arts, 
abuse that reduces their communicative pro-
perties to manipulation and deceit.  
 However, neither oratory nor music aims 
solely to communicate; both art forms speak 
above all to the passions in order to move the 
listener to persuasion. Clarity, which is 
primarily intellective, must therefore be 
complemented by the judicious use of or-
namentation. Ornamentation comprises the 
expressive core of music, thereby elevating 
																																																								
103 “Manche meynen was sie wunderschönes auf 
die Welt bringen, wenn sie in einem Adagio Cantabile 
die Noten rechtschaffen verkräuseln, und aus einer 
Note ein paar dutzend machen. Solche Notenwürger 
legen dadurch ihre schlechte Beurtheilungskraft zu 
Tage, und zittern, wenn sie eine lange Note aushalten 
oder nur ein paar Noten singbar abspielen sollten, ohne 
ihr angewöhntes, ungereimtes und lächerliches Fick 
Fack einzumischen.” Mozart, Versuch, 50, note p; trans. 
Knocker, Treatise, 51, note 1. 
104 “schönes.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und 
Aufzeichnungen, 1: 407; trans. Anderson, Letters, 173.  
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communication to art. Leopold defines the 
“common sense” required to execute proper 
embellishments by virtue of its absence:  
They play without method and without 
expression: piano and forte are not 
differentiated; the embellishments are in the 
wrong place, too overloaded, and mostly 
played in a confused manner; or often the 
notes are far too bare and one observes that 
the player knows not what he should do.105  
 For Leopold, the tasteful performance of 
a piece depended on the judicious use of 
expressive effects, in adherence to the 
expressive properties of the piece at hand and 
with an aim to move the hearer.  
Correctness and Propriety 
Correctness is quickly dispensed with in 
Cicero’s discussion of the virtues of style, for 
this is the province of rules and is therefore 
easily “conveyed by books and by elementary 
education.”106  
 Propriety, by contrast—elsewhere expres-
sed as “appropriateness” and “suitability”107—
defines oratory as fluid and therefore 
demands greater explication. Propriety relati-
vizes correctness, for this virtue demands that 
style be appropriate to content and context. 
Although there is a place for the simplicity of 
the “popular style,” its use should be ap-
propriate to the subject matter. Leopold thus 
admonishes his son,  
Perhaps you will get a contract to compose 
one [a German opera]. If you do, you know 
																																																								
105  “Sie spielen ohne Ordnung, und ohne 
Ausdruck; das Schwache und Starck wird nicht 
unterschieden; die Auszierungen sind am unrechten 
Orte, zu überhäuft, und meistens verwirret angebracht; 
manchmal aber sind die Noten gar zu leer, und man 
merket daß der Spielende nicht weiß, was er thun 
solle.” Mozart, Versuch, 253; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 
215–16. 
106 Cicero, De oratore, 2: 31. 
107 Ibid., 2: 43. 
that I need not urge you to imitate the natural 
and popular style, which everyone easily 
understands. The grand and sublime style is 
suited to grand subjects. Everything in its 
place.108  
 This is not to say that Leopold’s emphasis 
on the “popular style” was always aesthetically 
motivated, for he further recognized the 
potential for “light” music to appeal to a wide 
audience. Even with light music, however, the 
master distinguishes himself by creating a 
work that interests and pleases the connois-
seur without alienating the Liebhaber (ama-
teur): 
Do you imagine that you would be doing 
work unworthy of you? If so, you are very 
much mistaken. Did [Johann Christian] Bach, 
when he was in London, ever publish 
anything but similar trifles? What is light can 
still be great, if it is written in a natural, 
flowing, and easy style—and at the same time 
bears the marks of sound composition. Such 
works are more difficult to compose than all 
those harmonic progressions, which the 
majority of people cannot fathom, or pieces 
which have pleasing melodies, but which are 
difficult to perform. Did Bach lower himself 
by such work? Not at all. Good composition, 
sound construction, son—these distinguish the 
master from the bungler—even in trifles.109  
																																																								
108  “vielleicht bekommst Du eine zu machen? 
Sollte es geschehen, so weist Du ohne dem, daß ich Dir 
das natürliche, für jedermann leicht fassliche Populare 
nicht erst recommandieren darf; das grosse, erhabene 
gehört zu grossen Sachen. alles hat seinen Platz.” Bauer 
and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2: 99; trans. 
Anderson, Letters, 354. 
109  “glaubst Du Dich vielleicht durch solche 
Sachen herunter zu setzen?—keineswegs! hat dann 
[Johann Christian] Bach in London iemals etwas 
anders, als derley Kleinigkeiten herausgegeben? Das 
kleine ist groß, wenn es natürlich-flüssend und leicht 
geschrieben und gründlich gesetzt ist. Es so zu machen 
ist schwerer als alle die den meisten unverständlichen 
künstlichen Harmonischen progressionen, und schwer 
auszuführenden Melodyen. hat sich Bach dadurch 
heruntergesetzt?—keines wegs! Der gute Satz, und die 
ordnung, il filo—dieses unterscheidet den Meister vom 
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 As this passage testifies, propriety de-
mands consideration of both the nature of the 
work and the given audience’s taste. However, 
these two points of reference (namely, the 
audience and the work itself) are not always 
compatible; the tensions between them identify 
taste as Janus-faced: fluid and dialogic, on the 
one hand, and fixed and unyielding, on the 
other.  As befits his neoclassical orientation, 
Leopold reconciles this contradiction seam-
lessly: the successful composer yields to his 
audience’s taste ultimately as means to elevate 
that audience to a higher standard—in art and 
in life. 
 
Humanism denotes not only an engagement 
with humanistic studies but, further, a belief 
in the power of those studies to engender 
certain cultural values. 110  This is why the 
Society of Jesus placed such a high premium 
on classical learning; as I have suggested, 
Ciceronian classicism was seen to provide an 
intellectual and aesthetic complement to the 
ethical and religious teachings of the Jesuit 
faith, thus producing scholars of intellect, 
wisdom, faith, and moral uprightness. 
 Wisdom, morality, and faith were the 
three central tenets of the Jesuit educational 
ideal, and classical texts were viewed as one 
important resource for achieving it. I argue 
that Leopold was influenced by his classical 
studies, as his aesthetic concept of taste 
incorporates the principles and values therein. 
 It is no coincidence that these aesthetic 
values analogize with ethical ones. The Society 
of Jesus was an outward-facing religion, 
whose emphasis on classical learning served a 
																																																																																			
Stümper auch in kleinigkeiten.” Ludwig Schiedermair, 
Die Briefe W. A. Mozarts und seiner Familie (Munich: G. 
Müller, 1914), 4: 68–69; trans. Anderson, Letters, 599. 
110 Jill Kraye, ed., Cambridge Companion to Renaissance 
Humanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 1. 
broad civic agenda. Leopold’s aesthetic ideal 
of good taste, which emphasizes wisdom, 
uprightness, moderation, clarity, propriety, 
correctness, and expressive ornamentation, 
defines him as a humanist and, in the process, 
marks a further point of contact and comple-
mentarity between the rationalistic Enlighten-
ment and the Christian faith.  
 
